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Abstract
Indigenism in the South Indian state of Kerala today is as much about claims for redistri-
bution and democratization as about cultural recognition. This paper explores the many 
complex and contested ideological currents that hide behind the general cachet of global 
indigenism and starts by proposing a theoretical approach that draws attention to the more 
subaltern  currents  in  the  ﬁeld.  It  then  moves  on  to  distinguish  four  travelling  models of 
indigenism  that  have  partly  come  to  shape  the  ﬁeld  previously  dominated  by  class  disco-
urse, followed by a description of the expression of these travelling models in different 
indigenist ideologies in Kerala. I conclude with the argument that it is precisely in the lack 
of consensus on the ground on what indigenism means that there is hope that the present 
wave of indigenist mobilization can contribute towards reviving and deepening democracy 
rather than merely reinforcing cultural stereotypes in Kerala, and elsewhere.
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Introduction
Since the last quarter of the twentieth century, many people previously involved in so-
cialist politics have joined movements for indigenous rights. This is often interpreted as 
a liberatory moment, whereby due to a ‘cunning of history’ (Turner 2005), globalization 
has, despite its negative impact on people’s livelihoods, also enabled ‘a revolt against the 
forces of cultural uniformity and against the appropriation of indigenous peoples’ sovere-
ignty by states’ (Niezen 2003: 2). With both the desire and now also the means to pose a 
‘post-­liberal  challenge’  to  ‘ethnonational  homogeneity’  (Yashar  2005:  298),  people  ﬂock  
towards the international legal framework for indigenous rights, the only place to appeal 
for the right to cultural autonomy and self-government rather than mere integration into 
the wider national polity (Kymlicka 2008). What seems to be at stake for an increasing 
number of people around the world – whether always already considered indigenous or 
only recently emerging as such – is the desire to be recognized as belonging to a historically 
unique culture and deserving the right to legal sovereignty.
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Not everyone agrees, however, on this reading of indigenous movements. Whe-
reas June Nash (2001), for instance, sees the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas as a ‘quest 
for autonomy’ motivated by ‘Mayan visions’ and an entirely different cultural universe of 
values, Neil Harvey (1998) – paying more attention to the movements that the Zapatista 
rebellion grew out of and the political-economic tensions driving it – sees it as a ‘struggle 
for land and democracy’. Or whereas, for instance, Deborah Yashar sees the indigenist 
movement  in  Bolivia  and  the  rise  of  Evo  Morales  as  the  country’s  ﬁrst  indigenous  president  
as based on ‘an ethnic discourse about cultural rights and autonomy’ (2005: 185), Kathy 
Gordon sees the movement much more as ‘rooted in the left and class-based politics’ with 
Evo Morales widely known in Bolivia as a Trotskyite who uses his ‘indigenous’ identity 
to make his ‘left-wig politics more palatable in the international arena’ (2009: 8). As the 
case study from Kerala in this paper will show, there is no consensus on what indigenism 
is about in this South Indian state either. 
Critical approaches toward indigenism: Articulation and 
hegemony
Many scholars have been uneasy about the celebratory announcement of recognition-can-
tered identity politics under the banner of indigenism. One worry has been the fact that 
today’s progressive indigenous movements seem to be tapping into the same discursive 
repertoires as majoritarian, racist indigenous movements such as the British National Party 
(Kuper 2003) or Hindutva nationalists (Baviskar 2007). Though it is arguably misleading 
to equate majoritarian indigenous movements, attempting to assert racist privilege, with 
movements of dispossessed people trying to ‘resist discrimination and achieve progress 
towards equality’ (Kenrick and Lewis 2004), the culturalist turn that many activists have 
followed instead of an ineffective or discredited class agenda is not without consequence. 
A way of studying these consequences more concretely has been through theoretically-
informed ethnographies that are sensitive to the ‘frictions’ (Tsing 2007) – a combination 
of grip and irritation – that discourses of indigeneity produce for political subjects and that 
reveal the limits to the political aspirations that can be articulated within the ‘indigenous 
slot’ (Li 2000). The wider framework informing such research is that of ‘articulation’ 
theory, tracing the hegemonic processes behind political claim-making by looking at how 
ideological elements cohere into a certain discourse and are in turn taken up by certain 
political subjects (Hall 1996: 141–2). 
It is particularly the latter element of articulation – the relation between the dis-
course of indigenism and political subjects – that most research has focused on. Alpa Shah, 
for instance, argues that in fact many young adivasis (or tribals) in Jharkhand stay away 
from indigenous identity politics as they prefer a life of seasonal migration to brick kilns 
over the puritanically ‘indigenous’ moral climate at home that frames such migration as 
‘a threat to the purity and regulation of the social and sexual tribal citizen’ (2007: 1824). 
In other cases, ordinary adivasis can be seen not so much to retreat from the politics of 
indigenism themselves as see this politics leave them. Amita Baviskar (1998) for instance 
discusses how the imagery of ecologically noble savages in danger of perishing outside 
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their habitat – a discourse that was deployed by urban middle-class activists to oppose 
the  building  of  the  Narmada  Dam  –  eventually  became  self-­fulﬁlling  as  it  left  the  poorer,  
uneducated class of adivasi farmers in a desperate situation when the dam was built and 
no alternative livelihood strategies had been imagined. Kaushik Ghosh (2006), in a similar 
case  of  the  Koel  Karo  Dam,  describes  the  ‘awkwardness  of  ﬁt’  between  transnational  dis-
courses  with  the  speciﬁc  contexts  of  ‘indigenousness’  in  India.  He  argues  that  the  former  
has produced a nucleus of new political leaders who no longer need to be involved with 
the everyday struggles of land and territory but are continually encouraged ‘to perform 
and  ﬁt  the  paradigms  of  a  transnational  ‘indigenous’  subjectivity  that  has  little  resonance  
in the localities occupied by such populations in India’ (Ghosh 2006: 502). 
Tania Li (2000), in a comparative study of two similar groups in the Indonesian co-
untry-side, only one of which took up the label of indigeneity, shows that the process through 
which transnational frames become applicable – or inapplicable – to political subjects often 
has little to do with substantive differences between political localities but rather depends 
‘upon  the  regimes  of  representation  that  preconﬁgure  what  can  be  found  there,  together  with  
the  processes  of  dialogue  and  contestation  through  which  identiﬁcations  are  made  on  the  
ground’ (2000: 153-54). Ethnographies such as these show there are clear limits to issues 
that can be said within the discourse of indigenism, that it does not always take root and 
that, when it does, it can often further marginalize the poorest. They show there is friction 
between local and global actors, and activist and ordinary people’s understandings of in-
digenous identity. These ethnographies often prompt the conclusion that there is a serious 
problem in ‘the erosion of prior principles of mobilization and politicization’ that come with 
the  juridiﬁcation  of  resistance  and  the  hegemony  of  cultural  identity  in  shaping  collective  
action in ‘the neoliberal moment’ (Comaroff & Comaroff 2009: 139). 
Without denying this, it also seems that anthropological analysis should not push 
the hegemony of legal culturalism even further by only studying one side of the problematic 
of articulation – that of the frictions produced between indigenist discourse and political 
subjects – and neglect the study of how ‘ideological elements cohere into a certain dis-
course’ (Hall 1996: 141–2). Seeing the latter as a hegemonic process allows us to realize 
that dominant discourses often hide subaltern ideological elements that are more directly 
enabling to their political subjects. In other words, whereas the abovementioned critical 
ethnographies have demonstrated how hegemony works to produce certain contexts and 
issues of which the subaltern cannot speak, I would like to take a look at the other side 
of the coin where in fact the superaltern cannot hear. This possibility can be probed not 
so much by asking which realities articulate with indigenism but rather what alternative 
articulations of indigenism are covered by the hegemonic circulating interpretations of 
indigenism. Hegemony, in the words of William Roseberry, makes ‘the words … used by 
subordinate populations to talk about … or resist their domination [become] shaped by the 
process of domination itself’ (Roseberry 1994: 361). Yet on the other hand, as Roseberry 
himself emphasises, hegemony is never sharply demarcated, nor absolute. It is in this 
that the Gramscian approach to hegemony, in whose tradition Hall and Roseberry work, 
distinguishes itself from Foucauldian analyses of hegemony that stress its totalizing and 
normalizing effects. Following a Gramsican theory of hegemony, it is therefore possible 
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to look not just at the disarticulation or domination of hegemonic discourses over local 
realities but also to more closely listen to the talk that is relatively more resistant in adapting 
to dominant discourse. Before I discuss some of these subaltern indigenist currents in the 
case  of  Kerala,  I  will  ﬁrst  however  look  at  the  related  travelling models of indigenism at 
the global level. 
The travelling models of indigenism
Out  of  the  reconﬁguration  of  the  Left  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  20th century from more 
explicit class politics towards identity-based routes to emancipation and redistribution, 
various travelling models of indigenous voice have emerged. Usually only those spea-
king a language closest to the culturalist and legalist discourses that are gaining political 
momentum are recognized. It may be possible however to distinguish and describe these 
‘travelling models’ of indigenous voice with more attention to subaltern interpretation and 
Anna Tsing’s distinction of three travelling models of indigenous voice may be a useful 
starting point for this. 
The  ﬁrst  she  distinguishes  (2007:  42-­5)  is  concerned  primarily  with  sovereignty  
and  redress.  It  originates  in  a  Canada-­New  Zealand  axis,  initiated  by  ofﬁcial  government  
visits but continued in the cooperation of New Zealand Maori and indigenous – or soon-
to-be-called First  Nations – leaders in Canada in trying to use treaty rights and government 
settlements in the 19th and early 20th centuries to obtain political purchase. In the course of 
the 1970s, this axis grew to include indigenous people from the US, Australia and northern 
Europe, who together organized meetings such as the International Treaty Council (1974) 
to seek UN recognition for tribal treaties. 
Tsing’s  second  model  is  that  of  ‘pluri-­ethnic  autonomy’,  originating  in  the  ﬁrst  
Inter-American Indigenist Congress in Patzcuaro, Mexico, in 1940, where scholars and 
political  ﬁgures  from  both  continents  met  and  a  critical  discussion  on  indigenism  began.  
Along  this  inter-­American  axis,  a  radical  critique  later  developed  of  the  ofﬁcial  assimi-
lationist policy of indigenismo in Mexico. Demands for civil rights, cultural rights, class 
struggle and political freedom meanwhile were tabled by the Red Power movement in the 
US. Rather than accepting assimilation, activists seeking pluri-ethnic autonomy demanded 
a democratic reform of their nation-states through indigenous autonomy. As in the case of 
the Zapatistas, these struggles seek ‘to expand the possibilities of the nation, not withdraw 
from it’ (Tsing 2007: 48).
Thirdly, Tsing (2007) distinguishes the model of ‘environmental stewardship’, 
led by ‘forest dwellers’ – or often in fact their ‘non-native’ representatives – who have 
neither the purchase of national inclusion nor the precedence of treaty rights. This political 
current  had  difﬁculty  taking  off  because  in  Brazil  –  where  it  originated  –  international  
environmentalists and Indians were obstructed by accusations against them as being 
‘foreign’ and ‘unpatriotic’. It was only with the break-down of the myth of development 
in the 1980s and the moment of solidarity between the rural poor and Indians, that global 
environmentalist-indigenous alliances became legitimate and possible. Enthused by the 
success of this alliance in the late 1980s in the Brazilian Amazon, international advocates 
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for forest dwellers’ rights also set up camp in other places of environmental interest, no-
tably the Sarawak in Malaysia. 
Besides the overlap and convergence between the three models, Tsing also iden-
tiﬁes  certain  nodes  of  tension  within  each  model.  Regarding  the  ﬁrst  model,  she  points  
out that the rhetoric of sovereignty is seldom effective. Particularly in countries that only 
relatively recently gained national sovereignty themselves, sovereignty is ‘too precious to 
be handed out to small groups within the nation’ (certainly where this is suspected to be at 
the command of foreign powers). Where it is successful, as in the US, it produces its own 
problems as the legal process of being recognized tends to disenfranchise non-recognized 
tribes as well as people of mixed origin. 
‘Pluri-ethnic autonomy’ also has its tensions, particularly in the fact that the lan-
guage of autonomous indigeneity does not work out equally well for differently positioned 
subaltern  groups  and  is  sometimes  even  claimed  by  elites  themselves.  Tsing  however  ﬁnds  
the network around ‘environmental stewardship’ most problematic as it can lead to a ‘natural 
resource  tug-­of-­war’  (2007:  55)  in  more  than  one  way:  ﬁrstly,  it  can  pit  conservationists  
aims of pure human-less ‘nature’ (a modern bourgeois fantasy) against indigenous people 
who actually want to live off the land; secondly, it can produce a confrontation between the 
ideal of the ‘self-determination’ of indigenous elites to command over – and thus potential 
exploit – ‘their’ natural resources and the concerns of environmental groups. According to 
Tsing, this is mainly because it avoids the real issue that will always continue undermining 
environmental-indigenous utopias: the fact that ‘capitalist resource use structures even the 
most oppositional design for people and nature in indigenous zones’ (2007: 57).
Tsing’s distinctions and her attention on nodes  of  tension are extremely useful. Yet 
there are other possible maps of the indigenist terrain. Jeffrey Sissons (2005), for instance, 
also distinguishes environmental indigenism, which he calls ‘eco-indigenism’, from other 
forms of indigenism but he does not distinguish sharply between the search for indigenous 
citizenship within the nation-state, as in many Latin American countries, and the quest for 
territorial sovereignty in separation from the nation-state as he sees the latter merely as an 
inevitable tendency in countries where – unlike in New Zealand or most of Latin America 
– indigenous people form a minority and will thus always only at most gain indigenous 
minority citizenship within the nation-state (Sissons 2005: 136–7). More explicitly than 
Tsing, moreover, Sissons sees eco-indigenism and sovereign indigenism as not just some-
times overlapping but functioning in the same international network, forming one global 
movement. He therefore worries all the more about the effect of the rising hegemony of 
eco-indigenism on the indigenous movement as a whole. 
In comparison to Tsing, Sissons’ approach alerts us more forcefully to the problem 
of hegemony within the global indigenist movement. At the same time, though, by focusing 
on a critique of what is perhaps the most oppressive trend within global indigenism, the 
alternative  forms  of  indigenism  become  overly  simpliﬁed  or  altogether  ignored.  I  do  think,  
for  instance,  there  is  a  signiﬁcant  political  –  and  not  merely  geographical  –  difference  be-
tween Tsing’s ‘pluri-ethnic autonomy’ and the quest for territorial sovereignty. As the aim 
of this paper is to pay closer attention to the more subaltern currents in the transnational 
ﬁeld  of  indigenous  politics,  I  would  therefore  like  to  suggest  a  less  composite  analysis  of  
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global  indigenism  and  deﬁne  the  four  indigenist  currents  I  see  operating  internationally  
according to the more critical interpretation given to them outside of hegemonic circuits 
of representation. 
The  ﬁrst,  which  I  would  call  organic indigenism, is close to Sissons’ ‘eco-in-
digenism’ and Tsing’s ‘environmental stewardship’, yet by calling it organic I ask more 
attention to what goes on behind the more romanticized environmentalist (noble savage) 
discourses and actually appeals to most ordinary people themselves. Organic indigenism is 
a way to not become living fossils of a past of harmony with nature but to project notions 
of environmental respect into a more modern future, similar to what many small farmers 
– sometimes equally represented as inhabiting a baseline, traditional stage of human hi-
story – dream of (see McMichael 2009: 206). It is a vision of being independent from the 
multinationals dictating global agriculture today and forming an essential and enervating 
part of wider society. Organic indigenism stresses the direct practical steps that can be 
taken towards such a political ideal, starting with the redistribution of land. The geography 
of this model does not neatly follow the axis set out by Western environmentalist NGOs 
but rather travels with alternative peasant movements, such as the Via Campesina and as 
part  of  the  World  Social  Forum,  with  Mexico-­India  as  a  signiﬁcant  axis.  
The second form of indigenous politics that emancipatory politics has shifted to 
I would call autonomous indigenism rather than sovereign indigenism, because activists 
are often all too aware of the trap of mimicking Western national sovereignty regimes. The 
majority – though sometimes not the leadership – of participants in autonomous indige-
nous movements is not so keen on literal legal treaties or exclusive tribal zones, but rather 
seeks greater control over their direct environment and voice in national politics. Many 
activists know all too well from personal experience that there are shady areas where the 
indigenous or the tribal inextricably blends into the non-indigenous or non-tribal and that 
processes of legal recognition can do a lot of violence to this reality. It is along the US-
Australia axis that these politics indeed can perhaps best be seen as sovereignty-centred 
but the more subaltern versions of autonomous indigenism can be found in movements, 
and their international meetings, across Latin America, Africa and Asia. 
Thirdly,  I  would  suggest  to  consider  what  Tsing  identiﬁed  as  ‘pluri-­ethnic  autono-
my’ as democratic indigenism instead. Here indigenous people namely let go of strict ethnic 
references altogether and interpret indigeneity more in light of the historical experience 
of dispossession and exploitation. Before it clearly became autonomy-centred, the Red 
Power movement was for a while – for instance in 1968 when it closely cooperated with 
the Black Power movement and other minority and working-class organizations in the Poor 
People’s March on Washington DC (Nagel 1997: 130) – demanding democratic reform of 
US politics more so than Native American sovereignty. This kind of ‘red-black’ alliance 
– between so-called indigenous people and formerly enslaved and other marginalized or 
exploited populations – is, as we will see, even more evident in South India and seems to 
travel mainly along the more radical wings of international human rights organizations. 
Finally, Communist indigenism is a form that is perhaps most subaltern of the four 
as the more orthodox streams of both Communism and cultural indigenism tend to present 
themselves as absolute opposites. With usually few resources at their disposal, Communist 
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indigenists tend to lead a relatively marginalized existence today. The ideological current, 
travelling amongst the unorthodox, dissident branches of the Communist International, 
nevertheless has a strong historical basis. Theoretically, it starts from Marx’s own la-
tent doubts about the historical necessity of passing through capitalism before reaching 
communism and his ambivalent admiration for the primitive Russian village community 
(mir),  Engels’ study of the ‘primitive Communism’ of the gentile tribe and its egalitarian 
gender relations, and Lenin’s argument in favour of self-determination regarding ‘the na-
tionalities question’ (many of whom we now call indigenous people) in the Soviet Union. 
A particularly eloquent and revered exponent of Communist indigenism is Mariategui, 
a Marxist thinker and Communist Party leader in the 1920s in Peru, who defected from 
orthodoxy by taking great interest in ethnic and cultural indigenous issues, believing 
that ethnic observances will lend strength to, rather than detract energy from, the class 
struggle for a radical reorganization of the economy that was to begin with the issue of 
land (Mariategui [1928] 1971). He moreover, as most Communist indigenists today, saw 
in indigenous society a natural proclivity towards socialism. Sometimes, as in the case of 
Mariategui, the initiative for Communist indigenism lay with indigenous communities (see 
Becker 2009: 30), but in other cases, for instance in the efforts of Australian Communists 
to take up the cause of indigenous rights and support aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait 
Islanders in gaining greater control over their lives and communities (Boughton 2001), 
the initiative lay with non-indigenous Communists. Though its peak seems to have been 
in the early 20th century, Communist indigenism – the vision of indigenous people as the 
most revolutionary subjects, both because of their exploitation and because of their more 
communist ethos – continues to travel (though in third class) amongst the more radical, 
unorthodox fringes of Communist parties or movements.
The four axes of indigenism I distinguish certainly also have their nodes  of  tension, 
or particularly their hegemonic perversions. They moreover overlap in many ways. This 
will become clear in the following discussion of the concrete manifestations of these four 
models in Kerala. It is time to take a closer look at the ideological elements discernible 
in the emergent discourses of indigeneity in Kerala and how they relate to the four axes 
identiﬁed  above.  I  must  emphasise  that  though  I  analytically  distinguish  different  ideolo-
gical  inﬂuences,  I  have  tried  not  to  manipulate  my  ethnographic  material  so  as  to  be  able  
to offer ideal types of each, and thus sometimes various ideological elements overlap even 
in short quotes of what activists say. In the reality of indigenist politics, precisely because 
of the hegemony of certain ideological drives, we will see that activists almost always 
mix together different ideological elements and emphasize one or the other according to 
the particular context in which they speak. 
Organic indigenism
Many activists in Kerala hold to the ideal of indigenous people as being less alienated from 
nature and each other and of leading the way for modern citizens to regain a healthier, 
more sustainable way of life. Of the various stands of indigenism, the ideology of organic 
indigenism is moreover the one claiming to be least ideological. It tries to stay away from 
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the political arena and rather pushes for direct action, centered primarily on acquiring and 
cultivating land. Organic indigenism also offers a redeeming critique of the life many 
adivasis are forced to live in the rural ghettoes or colonies located on tiny pieces of land 
on the edge of villages: a suffocating and unnatural life full of internal quarrelling, dome-
stic violence and alcoholism that are considered far from adivasi culture. For adivasis in 
such circumstances, organic indigenism holds out both an ideal for a better future and a 
more honourable identity, one that they can take pride in and set as an example to the rest 
of society. Although it is focused on the local, organic indigenism also purports to be a 
powerful counter to commercialized agriculture and multinational interests and a potential 
solution to climate change and environmental depletion. Proof for the greater environmental 
awareness of adivasis is given by the fact that they used to live in the forest for centuries 
without logging and depleting the area as contractors are now doing. They moreover 
continue to have a much greater knowledge of nature. In Kerala, the adivasi communities 
of agricultural labourers leading the indigenist movement are moreover known as expert 
paddy cultivators. Thus, they are able to ideologically link their current unemployment to 
Kerala’s decreasing food sovereignty as it imports an embarrassing 80 percent of its rice 
from outside the state (see Jacob 2006).
C.K. Janu, often referred to as the organic leader of Kerala’s main adivasi move-
ment – the Adivasi Gothra Maha Sabha – was born to parents who were both agricultural 
labourers,  working  the  paddy  ﬁelds  of  local  landlords  and  supplementing  their  meagre  
wages with food gathered in the forest. She herself worked most of her childhood as a 
maid in another family’s household and later followed her parents’ footsteps, becoming an 
agricultural labourer herself. Janu does not have any formal education but became literate 
later in life through a state-wide literacy campaign lead by Leftist activists in the 1980s. 
She also gained political literacy through becoming a member of the Communist Party’s 
Farmers’ Union. Yet she decided it was ‘time for adivasis to start taking matters into their 
own hand’ (quotes from interview 21 June 2006). As she eloquently says: 
Here in Kerala, politicians have led the people beyond politics … their 
ideologies have depoliticized the people; they have become blind slaves 
to political ideologies. In olden times, people were slaves to feudal lords. 
Now these landlords have vanished and so the people are blind followers 
of politicians. They think that without the help of politicians nothing can 
be done.
Janu gained her own piece of land precisely by occupying a government-owned 
plantation and she continued these activities with other communities, eventually leading 
a wave of land occupations in Northern Kerala. Most of her activism concentrates on the 
local level, though she has been on several international tours, some funded by the UNWIP, 
another (organized together with radical farmers’ movements) by the alter-globalist mo-
vement People’s Global Action. Part of Janu’s charisma as a leader lies in her ability to 
articulate adivasi emancipation in a proud and practical manner that nevertheless strongly 
engages with wider farmers’ concerns: 
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Consider the things that adivasis do these days … it is for the existence of the 
world, nature, and human existence. Suppose, adivasis struggle for land, get 
land and start cultivating things that are needed for their daily subsistence … 
tapioca, chena (elephant yam,) chembu (a kind of tuber), paddy ... they will 
not consume all of that ... some of it will reach the market and change the 
current ways of farming with multinationals’ chemical insecticides, which 
brings all kinds of poison into our bodies. When our traditional products 
reach the market and people come and buy things there, they become linked 
to  the  struggle.  Even  their  blood  gets  puriﬁed  when  they  eat  these  vegetables.  
What the adivasis do and have done has wider results. Look at how it is for 
the good of all. And they call it just an ‘adivasi struggle’.
Despite claims to the contrary, most participants in the AGMS and other adivasis in 
Kerala, however, have no reason or even possibility of being more respectful of nature than 
others, nor are they necessarily that much closer to it. When organic indigenism becomes 
inﬂated  by  elite  eco-­indigenist  exaggerations  of  indigenous  harmony  with  nature,  it  becomes  
particularly problematic. In a piece in Indigenous  Affairs,  the  inﬂuential  publication  of  the  
International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs, Janu is tempted to take on a discourse 
similar to that of many NGO’s focus on biodiversity guardians claiming that ‘for us, the 
earth has no price – she is our mother – and the forest, our father’. 
Sentimentalism that poses adivasis as somehow one with nature is, however, easy 
prey for groups opposing the movement. Nowhere was this clearer than during the most 
well-known occupation organized by the AGMS at Muthanga, a wildlife sanctuary in the 
north of Kerala (see Bijoy & Raman 2003). Though ideas about living in harmony with 
nature had been circulated by the AGMS leadership, the occupiers at Muthanga simply 
started to plow the earth and plant crops the way they were used to. They were worried about 
the AGMS’ choice of occupying land in a nature reserve as wild elephants were posing a 
threat to newly planted crops and were terrifying the occupiers themselves. When these 
kind of stereotype-defying facts were discovered by a group of notables calling themselves 
the Wayanad Environmental Protection Society, an outraged ‘spot investigation report’ 
was sent to the government to ‘disclose’ that the adivasis present at Muthanga were in fact 
not ‘real adivasis’ but merely ‘Janu and her gangmen’ (see also Steur 2009). The tragic 
outcome was that the government eventually felt legitimized in violently suppressing the 
occupation, leading to two deaths and many permanently injured. 
Autonomous indigenism
The drive toward autonomy is an important undercurrent in Kerala’s indigenist politics. 
It partly appeals to the elite adivasi communities – particularly the Kurichias – who con-
tinue  to  pride  themselves  on  being  amongst  the  ﬁrst  freedom  ﬁghters  in  India  as  warriors  
of Pazhassi Raj, the king who ruled the regions of Northern Kerala, against the British in 
1787. For some of the traditionalists among them, it is primarily the desire to regain their 
imagined status as a ruling elite of the area that attracts them to indigenist initiatives. In 
contrast, lower-caste adivasi communities can also be seen to play with the ideas of auto-
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nomous indigenism as the desire to be rid of the claims of those communities who used 
to have them as bonded. This feeling is still particularly strong among second-generation 
freed  workers.  As  such,  autonomous  indigenism  ﬁnds  its  expression,  for  instance,  in  one  
of the points of agreement signed between the Adivasi Gothra Maha Sabha and the Chief 
Minister of Kerala in 2001 for the state government to pass a cabinet resolution asking the 
Union government to declare the adivasi areas of Kerala Scheduled Areas by incorporating 
them under Schedule V of the Constitution. The latter allows a state’s Governor to, upon 
advice and at least consultation with an established Tribal Advisory Council, prescribe 
rules in the scheduled area that are not necessarily applicable to the rest of the state. Such 
rules often include restrictions on the sale of land in such areas and against money-lending 
practices, but can also include other special laws suggested by the Tribal Advisory Council. 
It was also in this light that activists set up a check-point at the entrance to the area that 
the Adivasi Gothra Maha Sabha occupied at Muthanga wildlife sanctuary, mimicking the 
ofﬁcial  state  check-­point  at  the  general  entrance  of  the  sanctuary  and  signalling  to  outsiders  
to respect the adivasi settlement’s self-rule. 
Before their occupation of Muthanga, the Adivasi Gothra Maha Sabha had already 
been setting up informal self-governance structures or oru sabhas as a clan(gothra)-based, 
horizontal form of social organizing to counter the centralizing governance of the state and 
become self-organized. Autonomous indigenism resonates both with the Gandhian ideal of 
panchayat raj (village republics) and with the more recent people’s planning campaign in 
Kerala,  a  government  design  to  devolve  signiﬁcant  authority  and  resources  to  the  panchayat 
(municipal) level. Unlike these campaigns, the AGMS’ is however much more culturally-
based to prevent democracy from becoming simply local upper-caste rule. Each clan or 
nation has its own governance structure with six democratically elected representatives 
(an equal proportion of men and women) who can be revoked by the clan if necessary. It 
was also in this fashion that people at Muthanga organized themselves to form the basis 
for democratic self-governance.
Geethanandan, considered the main strategic leader of the AGMS, is perhaps one of 
the most outspoken proponents of autonomous indigenism. He is a highly-educated dalit, hol-
ding an MA in Marine Biology. He used to have a prestigious job in the Accountant General’s 
ofﬁce,  which  he  left  however  to  engage  fully  in  unionizing  workers  in  the  unorganized  sector.  
This apparently opened his eyes to the caste  question: 
The people I worked with ... their problems required a caste-based approach 
rather than a class-based one because the discrimination against them was 
mainly caste-based. The Left never had any satisfactory answer to caste-
based problems (Interview 20 September 2005). 
Though having been a leading member of the CPI(Marxist-Leninist), he has now 
sworn off all Communist ideology: 
I have totally rejected or totally … such Communist movement because they 
are centralized political systems, statist political systems, like the Brahmini-
cal state or the caste structure … same thing is happening in the Communist 
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Party. Like the capitalist state … whether it is the capitalist state or the 
Brahminical state or the Marxist state … they are all statist orders … this 
graded hierarchy and power structure is there. I would like to negate it.
Autonomy certainly in this respect also refers to the need for adivasis to organize 
outside of the co-opting networks of existing political parties. To become freer of the Kerala 
political scene, Geethanandan has travelled within India to other adivasi and dalit meetings 
and reads literature on the struggles of other indigenous groups around the world – notably 
the Red Indians of America and their quest for recognition as sovereign nations. Much of 
his language resonates with the terminology of sovereign indigenism in the US (as well as 
with old-fashioned Communist terminology), for example referring to different so-called 
tribes as nations  ﬁghting  for  a  homeland under the guidance of C. K. Janu as a nationalist 
leader. Autonomy also however refers to decentralization as the main strategy towards 
liberation, and Geethanandan indeed strongly believes in the AGMS’s drive to revive 
clan-based forms of organizing as ‘a totally decentralized, or actually “non-centralized” 
form of activity.’ He see the process unfolding in Kerala, whereby adivasis are uniting and 
daring to put forward political leaders of their own, as a historic break-through in terms 
of the ‘autonomy question’ and the ‘constitutional question’. He was one of the initiators 
of organizing a political party, the Rashtriya Maha Sabha, as a sister organization of the 
AGMS in order to make sure adivasis would have representatives in the state parliament 
and thus a political presence in Kerala.
There are nevertheless certain problems that autonomous indigenism poses. One 
is that autonomous indigenism, especially in connection to organizations based in the 
tribal state of North-East India, such as the National Front for Tribal Self-Rule, tends to 
raise the spectre of secessionism, which in turn invites particularly brutal suppression by 
states. A more internal problem is however that by organizing explicitly on a clan basis, 
it is undeniable that though the aim is to empower people to counter discrimination, the 
fault lines on the basis of which discrimination takes place in fact deepen. Rather than 
emphasising their distinctiveness and autonomy from surrounding communities, some of 
the adivasis I talked to preferred to work with and negotiate with neighbouring communities 
in order to become integrated as equal citizens into Kerala society. As community-based 
organizing does not guarantee for intra-community solidarity, it may in fact end up being a 
self-marginalizing strategy. This in any case was the fear some participants in the AGMS’ 
Muthanga occupation expressed to me in reaction to the leadership’s call to revert to adivasi 
traditions only, abandon going to church, visiting Hindu temples or sending children to out-
side schools. Though in principle autonomy does not imply cultural purity, in liberal states 
claims for autonomy or self-rule tend only to be tolerated if communities can demonstrate 
some degree of cultural authenticity (see Sonntag 2005), which places pressure on adivasi 
communities to start policing each other for such signs. Ideally autonomy gives people the 
right to determine (and change) their lives as they desire, but such internal autonomy is 
inevitably linked to relational autonomy and thus dependent on the recognition of others. 
It is a slippery slope from the quest for autonomy to transformation along the criteria set 
out for such autonomy by mainstream society. As Gerald Sider puts it, organized attempts 
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at achieving autonomy can often end up creating and solidifying the very state that bullies 
indigenous people into compliance (Sider 2003: xxvi) or, if the opposite strategy is chosen, 
it can lead people to become even more hard-pressed in the process of denying – and thus 
being denied –legal recognition or integration (ibid.: lxiii).
Democratic indigenism 
In  South  India,  we  ﬁnd  another  version  of  indigenism  that  has  its  roots  in  the  democratic  
movement lead by dalits – the outcastes of India – and takes inspiration particularly from 
the dalit leader and father of the Indian constitution, Dr. Ambedkar (see Omvedt 1997). 
Democratic indigenism mixes the proud assertion of previously despised identities with 
an emphasis on equal opportunities in participating in modern society. It builds on the 
theory that dalits and adivasis belong to the same Dravidian culture or (dark) race that was 
subjugated by the invasion of Aryan Brahmins. The latter introduced a hierarchical caste 
system to the region that either, in the case of dalits, enslaved the original inhabitants or, 
in the case of adivasis,  forced  them  to  ﬂee  deep  into  the  hills  or  forests  so  as  to  escape  this  
ordeal. In this ideological framework, dalits and adivasis are in fact the same people as 
those normally called dalits (i.e. the Scheduled Castes/SCs) are also the original inhabitants 
of the area, whereas those known now as adivasis (i.e. the Scheduled Tribes/STs) are also 
among the most oppressed people of Kerala. For this reason, democratic indigenists have 
also pushed for the inclusion of dalits in the UN Working Group on Indigenous People. 
Adivasis are believed to be closer to the original egalitarian Dravidian culture, though 
they need their dalit brothers, who are closer to mainstream, casteist culture, to better 
strategically organize their struggle. For both groups, the main enemy is the Brahminical 
caste system, as either through encroachment or exploitation, caste is the primary source 
of oppression in Kerala. In this, democratic indigenism strongly condemns the Communist 
ideology that many dalits and adivasis in Kerala used to ally to for having in fact nurtured 
casteism precisely by propagating class as the primary social contradiction and assuming 
the evil of caste would simply wither away as society progressed. Both in order to take 
pride  in  a  difﬁcult  and  oppression-­ridden  history  and  to  be  able  to  confront  the  other  main  
ideology on the Left (Communism), democratic indigenism thus formulates its aspirations 
towards equality and justice in a cultural discourse of indigeneity.
Ramakrishnan, a previous leader of the Adivasi Federation in North Kerala and 
now member of the Dalit Panthers, is a good example of a democratic indigenist. A Ku-
ruma by origin – one of the two wealthier tribes in Northern Kerala – his family owned 
some land and worked hard as day labourers for their belief that their son ought to beco-
me  educated.  With  the  additional  help  of  speciﬁc  grants  and  beneﬁts  open  to  Scheduled  
Tribe students, Ramakrishnan indeed managed to do so: ‘My father and mother met my 
educational expenses through the money they raised by kooli pani [day labour]. And I re-
ceived some meagre grants from the government also. During that period I mostly stayed 
in [government] tribal hostels.’ 
It was during his student days at St. Mary’s College in the city that he became 
attracted to human rights politics, which he continues to work for beside the government 
job at the Food Corporation of India he managed to secure through the quota for Schedu-
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led Tribes. About his ideological inclination he says ‘Its [the Dalit Panther’s] ideology is 
Ambedkarism. We perceive dalit liberation through Ambedkarism. The term ‘‘dalit’’ in 
the context of our organization stands for all the oppressed. We use the term not just to 
represent a particular community.’ 
‘Dalit’ for him means ‘oppressed ... that’s the sense in which Dr. Babasaheb Am-
bedkar used the term: your caste or religion don’t matter, it’s the intensity of oppression 
that counts.’ 
The reason for him leaving the Adivasi Federation was that he saw it as starting 
to over-represent Kuruma interests at the expense of Ambedkarite ideology. The Dalit 
Panthers, in contrast, do not stand only for tribes but for all the oppressed. They are well 
networked with human rights groups in the major Indian cities, particularly the Mumbai 
Dalit Panthers who in turn were strongly inspired (as the name already reveals) by the 
Black Panther movement in the US. It is an explicitly modern politics, focused on equal 
opportunities in education and employment for members of oppressed communities. As 
Ramakrishnan explains:
The world around us is changing and there is no point in adivasis sticking 
to a particular cultural pattern. Even other orthodox communities, like the 
Brahmins, have changed. See the world around us is moving fast. So the 
tribes should not think about going back to the old forest culture … I won’t 
agree with going back to traditional ways, though there are good adivasi 
rituals and arts. We should accept the changes that time brings.
One problem that democratic indigenism runs into is that government categori-
zations – the strict separation between Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes – are often 
stronger than ideological commitments to a more unconventional reading of dalit and 
adivasi identity. Ironically, the fact that the ideological guru of democratic indigenism in 
India – Dr. Ambedkar – was himself the person to draft the constitution granting different 
rights   and  beneﬁts   to  Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes does not make this any 
easier. Dalit and adivasi identity moreover do not seem to shape the overall ideology to 
an equal extent. As Dr. Ambedkar himself did when arguing against the ‘indifferentism’ 
of the caste system that lead to ‘the aborigines ... remain[ing] savages because they [the 
Hindus] had made no effort to civilize them, to give them medical aid, to reform them’ 
(Ambedkar in Rodriguez 2002: 279), the critique of caste is often prioritized over a more 
appreciative understanding of adivasi life. It is, moreover, clear to most activists that there 
are  so-­called  tribes  whose  political  priority  would  be  to  get  educational  beneﬁts,  whereas  
there are ex-untouchable groups whose priority is gaining land. Nevertheless, activists 
often revert to the SC/ST distinction when the problem comes up of class distinctions 
(and thus differing priorities) within the movement. A consequence of this is in turn that 
SC movements tend to favour the so-called creamy layer amongst dalits whose primary 
concerns   are   reservation  beneﬁts   (as   land   is   no   longer   an   issue   to   them),  whereas  ST  
movements tend to lose the solidarity from so-called forward tribes who, already having 
land and aspiring to other venues of emancipation, see no use in being with a movement 
centered merely on land rights.
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Communist indigenism
Communist  indigenism  in  Kerala  hardly  emerges  from  the  ofﬁcial  Communist  Party  as  the  
latter has largely (though not always) followed the orthodox line on the ‘tribal question’ 
that says ethnic identities are dividing the working-class and creating false consciou-
sness. While the CPI(M) focused primarily on the urban proletariat as the revolutionary 
agent of history, more unorthodox communist factions had much greater faith in a rural 
uprisings, notably along the lines of Mao’s peasant-based people’s war. Particularly 
since the Naxalbari uprising in the late 1960s, radical communists in India started to 
pay  greater  attention  to  marginal,  rural  populations  and  for  the  ﬁrst  time,  tribals came to 
be considered the most promising revolutionaries: they were at the same time the most 
exploited of proletarians – with nothing to lose but their chains – and less contaminated 
by a capitalist mind-set or compromised by capital’s integrative power. Naxalbari was 
the village in West-Bengal where young radical communists came to support the local 
peasant population in their struggle, and in 1967 staged a violent uprising under the banner 
of land to the tiller. This place, where the various strands of Naxalism that exist today 
were born, was a predominantly tribal (Santhal) village and by now, with the resurgence 
of Naxalism in these areas, tribal areas are often seen as synonymous to Naxal areas. By 
the early 1970s, Naxalism had also reached Kerala, inspiring many of the more radical 
young Communist Party members to go into the country-side to live amongst the rural 
poor and support their struggles. Varghese, the young Christian settler and Communist 
Party member who followed this ideal and became the leader of the Naxalite movement 
in the seventies in Kerala mostly worked with adivasi agricultural labourers. Together, 
the more urban communist radicals and adivasi workers organized strikes as well as 
several attacks on police stations in Northern Kerala. During Indira Gandhi’s Emergency 
period, Naxalism was however heavily suppressed. It seems the movement never quite 
regained its intellectual and political vitality, though today new Naxal factions, such as 
the Adivasi Liberation Front, have sprung up in the tribal areas of Kerala. Highly criti-
cal of the Communist Party, many of these groups focus on the adivasi as the primary 
revolutionary subject and indeed are often lead by adivasis themselves. 
K. Vasu (interview 28 July 2009) is a good example of a communist indigenist. 
He was part of Varghese’s struggle in the 1970s and suffered from heavy state suppression: 
for his involvement in an attack on a cruel landlord, who had murdered one of his paniya 
workers, he and a number of his comrades (eight adivasis among them) spent seven years 
in prison – in his case mostly in an isolation cell. Because of his lower-caste background 
(he is an Izhava),  he  has  had  only  ﬁve  years  of  formal  education,  but  he  is  extremely  well-­
read as he spent hours on end reading in the public village library set up by the Communist 
Party in his neighbourhood in Calicut. He now lives from the small umbrella store he runs, 
but still dedicates his life to activism. In the 1970s, when Mao’s work was being translated 
into  Malayalam  for  the  ﬁrst  time,  he  became  particularly  interested  in  this  ideology  and  
its  emphasis  on  organizing  amongst  the  poorest  in  the  rural  areas  rather  than  the  ofﬁcial  
Communist focus on workers in the big cities. He moreover came to see caste oppression 
as the main contradiction in India: 
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In India, class is expressed through caste. See, water and ice, they are both 
made  of  the  same  substance  but  ice  is  solid  and  frozen  whereas  water  is  ﬂuid.  
In Kerala, caste is the ice, class is like water. Any Communist should under-
stand this clearly. But unfortunately they have not understood this at all. 
He is disappointed not only with the main Communist Party, the CPI(M), but 
also with the new generation of Naxal groups that are often again led by upper-castes. 
Therefore,  he  is  presently  no  longer  afﬁliated  with  any  particular  party  but  strongly  su-
pports C.K. Janu: 
I  ﬁrst  noticed  her  when  she  came  to  Calicut  with  seventy  adivasi women 
to hold a demonstration … I could not believe it! I remember the adivasi 
men I worked with in the Thrirunelli action [the killing of the landlord] … 
we were getting ready to go, it was like our last supper – we did not know 
who would survive and who would die. It was in one of the adiya [adivasi] 
houses, about ten or twelve people were sitting around eating. There were 
two young adivasi men on each side of me whom I did not know. They had 
been told by Varghese to come and sit next to me … but they did not want 
to, they were frightened of me. They went to sit beside me but slowly they 
moved back again to sit next to Varghese because they were afraid ... Now 
imagine, from this same community a woman leader emerges who comes 
down to the city with seventy adivasi women to protest! So in 1993, when 
Janu went to jail for her part in a land struggle, I went to interview her. The 
ﬁrst  thing  I  asked  her  was:  ‘Where  do  you  come  from?’  ‘Thrisilleri’,  she  
told me. I told her there were eight adivasis from Thrisilleri with me in jail 
and asked whether she knew them. ‘Yes’, she said, ‘one of them, Kalan, was 
my uncle’. Janu herself does not know she is the ideological daughter of 
the Naxalite movement, she is brainwashed in a way that she will not give 
credit to the Naxalite movement.
Vasu tells of how many adivasis now remember the Naxal movement mostly by 
the police brutalities that followed in its wake. But it was due to the Naxals that adivasis 
managed to end the system of slave trade, that adivasi  children  went  to  school  for  the  ﬁrst  
time,  that  the  land  reform  laws  of  the  ﬁrst  communist  government  actually  got  implemen-
ted and that higher wages were paid. At present, Vasu is still active in organizing public 
debate and supporting the AGMS, trying to convince its leaders – who often stay at his 
home – of seeing the bigger picture: 
Janu  is  not  clear  about  the  fact  that  you  have  to  ﬁght  an  ideological  ﬁght  …  
she thinks you can solve the question of land peacefully … but the problem 
of landlessness will not be solved if some adivasis here and there get land 
and start leading middle-class lives. Adivasis belong to the 70% of Indians 
who are now even poorer than when the British left. Their main enemy is this 
feudal Savarna [uppercaste] ideology and for adivasis to become liberated 
that  is  what  we  need  to  ﬁght.
In a place like Kerala where the CPI(M) is a dominant political party that tries to 
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co-opt any kind of Leftist initiatives that develop in the state into its network and where 
Naxals have to operate mostly underground, communist indigenism tends to be a rather 
isolated force in practice. Many intellectuals, like for instance Geethanandan, who used 
to be a (second-generation) Naxal, have distanced themselves from communism as it is 
too heavily associated with hypocrisy, the middle classes and a refusal to genuinely en-
gage with oppressed identities other than class. It takes an extraordinarily clear-minded 
and determined activist like K. Venu to steer a middle way between orthodox communist 
and essentialist indigenism. More isolated Naxal adivasi movements like the present-day 
Adivasi Liberation Front hold to a rather unfruitful combination of class analysis and cul-
tural rethinking whereby tribals simply take the place of the proletariat as revolutionary 
agents. As K. Venu moreover explains, most ex- or non-communist movements often 
strongly deny the legacy of communist organizing amongst, by and for adivasis and the 
basis communist movements have laid for present-day indigenist movements. Commu-
nist adivasi leaders, such as another uncle of Janu (also called Kalan), who was a critical 
and outspoken member of the CPI(M), are nowadays disavowed as mere dupes or at best 
the result of hypocritical symbolic gestures of the CPI(M). A similar discourse disavows 
Naxalite-adivasi cooperation, claiming that when adivasis joined this was either because 
they had no idea what Naxalism was about or were even forced into it through the threat 
of violence. The mutual hostility of ruling communism and new social movements plus the 
brutal repression of Naxalism in the late 1970s make Communist indigenism a particularly 
subaltern current in the ideological landscape of indigenism. 
Conclusion
Structural transformations that characterize the age of late capitalism – notably the shift from 
expanded reproduction to accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2005 ) – have often made 
explicit class-based mobilization ineffective and people therefore turn to internationally 
more powerful genres such as that of indigenism: ‘peasant activists became indigenous 
activists to utilize the international cachet of indigenous politics’ (Tsing 2007: 47). The 
success of indigenous movements thus often lies precisely in their ability to ‘bring together 
familiar demands for social justice and the language of indigenous rights’ (ibid.). 
This paper discussed the different ideological varieties of these demands for social 
justice  that  I  saw  being  articulated  in  the  language  of  indigenism  during  my  ﬁeldwork  in  
Kerala  and  linked  them  with  certain  transnational  political  inﬂuences.  I  did  this  in  order  
to complicate and challenge the idea that the global rise of indigenism is necessarily about 
the spreading desire for cultural recognition and legal autonomy. On closer inspection, 
this reading seems to be merely a hegemonic interpretation of indigenism. Elite allies of 
organic indigenist movements tend to present a picture of indigenous people as living in 
harmony with nature, whereas on the ground these movements are primarily about getting 
land and resisting multinational encroachment. Other indigenist activists, who are more 
concerned with resisting the state as a concentration of power, become remodelled in 
hegemonic representations as seeking recognition of their authentic indigeneity from this 
very state. Other readings of indigeneity such as the current that re-interprets indigeneity 
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as  an  experience  of  oppression  that  can  inspire  the  ﬁght  for  democratic  reform  are  often  
not even registered as belonging to the universe of indigenism because the essentialist 
commonsensical category of the indigenous person  disqualiﬁes  such  political  reinterpreta-
tions. In the current conjuncture, communist indigenism is perhaps most overlooked of all 
as dominant interpretations of indigenism and communism construct these as two opposite 
ideologies even where they constantly appear together and where many contemporary 
indigenist leaders have a strong communist background.
It is thus not only a question of whether or not local realities articulate with 
indigenous identity discourses or not but also of whether local reinterpretations of indi-
genous identity politics manage to be heard at all. If indeed they are not and hegemonic 
interpretations of indigenous politics remain simply culturalist, a self-reinforcing cycle of 
dis-articulation is inevitable. For this reason, it matters whether or not indigenous move-
ments are said to be primarily about claiming recognition for difference or are analysed 
in their full complexity, beyond hegemonic mirages. As the general frame of indigenism 
undoubtedly has a tendency towards reinforcing cultural stereotypes and pushing forward 
legally exclusivist solutions, it is all the more important to consider the contradictions and 
tensions  within  the  global  ﬁeld  of  indigenism  and  to  pay  due  attention  to  the  more  subaltern  
interpretations of indigenist politics. 
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POVZETEK
Avtohtonost  v  južni  indijski  državi  Kerala  je  danes  ravno  toliko  povezana  z  zahtevki  za  
prerazporeditev in demokratizacijo kot je s kulturnim priznanjem. Prispevek raziskuje 
množico  kompleksnih  in  nasprotujočih  si  ideoloških  tokov,  ki  se  skrivajo  pod  splošnim  
dežnikom  globalne  avtohtonosti  in  začenja  s  predlogom  teoretskega  pristopa,  ki  opozarja  
na  bolj  prikrite  tokove  na  tem  polju.  Nato  se  premakne  na  razločevanje  med  štirimi  potu-
jočimi  modeli  avtohtonosti,  ki  so  se  delno  izoblikovali  na  področju,  ki  ga  je  prej  obvla-
doval  razredni  diskurz.  Sledi  opis  izražanja  teh  potujočih  modelov  v  različnih  ideologijah  
avtohtonosti  v  Kerali.  Zaključujem  s  trditvijo,  da  je  ravno  v  pomanjkanju  soglasja  o  tem,  
kaj avtohtonost pomeni, upanje, da lahko sedanji val mobilizacije avtohotnosti prispeva k 
oživitvi  in  poglabljanju  demokracije,  ne  pa  zgolj  h  krepitvi  kulturnih  stereotipov  v  Kerali  
in drugje. 
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